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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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******************* 
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WILLIAM P. BARR, in his official capacity  
as Attorney General of the United States; and  
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_______________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Though the opioid crisis may call for innovative solutions, 
local innovations may not break federal law. Drug users die 
every day of overdoses. So Safehouse, a nonprofit, wants to 
open America’s first safe-injection site in Philadelphia. It fa-
vors a public-health response to drug addiction, with medical 
staff trained to observe drug use, counteract overdoses, and of-
fer treatment. Its motives are admirable. But Congress has 
made it a crime to open a property to others to use drugs. 21 
U.S.C. § 856. And that is what Safehouse will do. 
Because Safehouse knows and intends that its visitors will 
come with a significant purpose of doing drugs, its safe-
injection site will break the law. Although Congress passed 
§ 856 to shut down crack houses, its words reach well beyond 
them. Safehouse’s benevolent motive makes no difference. 
And even though this drug use will happen locally and 
Safehouse will welcome visitors for free, its safe-injection site 
falls within Congress’s power to ban interstate commerce in 
drugs. 
Safehouse admirably seeks to save lives. And many Amer-
icans think that federal drug laws should move away from law 
enforcement toward harm reduction. But courts are not arbiters 
of policy. We must apply the laws as written. If the laws are 
unwise, Safehouse and its supporters can lobby Congress to 
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carve out an exception. Because we cannot do that, we will re-
verse and remand. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The federal drug laws 
Drug addiction poses grave social problems. The opioid cri-
sis has made things worse: more than a hundred Americans die 
every day of an overdose. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Office of the Surgeon General, Facing Addiction in America: 
The Surgeon General’s Spotlight on Opioids 1 (2018). People 
of good will disagree about how to tackle these enormous prob-
lems. Lawmakers and prosecutors have traditionally used 
criminal prosecution to try to stem the flow, targeting the sup-
ply and hoping to curb demand. Others emphasize getting users 
into rehab. Harm-reduction proponents favor treating drug us-
ers without requiring them to abstain first. Still others favor 
decriminalizing or even legalizing drugs. There is no consen-
sus and no easy answer. 
But our focus is on what Congress has done, not what it 
should do. Congress has long recognized that illegal drugs 
“substantial[ly]” harm “the health and general welfare of the 
American people.” 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). Indeed, half a century 
ago, Congress tackled this national problem by consolidating 
scattered drug laws into a single scheme: the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–
971); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10–12 (2005). To this 
day, this scheme governs the federal approach to illegal drugs. 
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Title II of that law, the Controlled Substances Act, broadly 
regulates illegal drugs. The Act spells out many crimes. A per-
son may not make, distribute, or sell drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
He may not possess them. § 844. He may not take part in a drug 
ring. § 848. He may not sell drug paraphernalia. § 863. He may 
not conspire to do any of these banned activities. § 846. And he 
may not own or maintain a “drug-involved premises”: a place 
for using, sharing, or producing drugs. § 856. 
This last crime—the one at issue—was added later. At first, 
the Act said nothing about people who opened their property 
for drug activity. Then, the 1980s saw the rise of crack houses: 
apartments or houses (often abandoned) where people got to-
gether to buy, sell, use, or even cook drugs. See United States 
v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992). These 
“very dirty and unkempt” houses blighted their neighborhoods, 
attracting a stream of unsavory characters at all hours. Id. But 
it was hard to shut crack houses down. To go after owners, po-
lice and prosecutors tried to cobble together conspiracy and 
distribution charges. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 714 
F.2d 689, 691–92 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 
474 U.S. 806 (1985). But no law targeted the owner or main-
tainer of the premises. 
To plug this gap, Congress added a new crime: 21 U.S.C. 
§ 856. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
§ 1841, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207–52. This law banned running a 
place for the purpose of manufacturing, selling, or using drugs. 
Congress later extended this crime to reach even temporary 
drug premises and retitled it from “Establishment of manufac-
turing operations” to “Maintaining drug-involved premises.” 
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Compare 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) & caption (2003) with 21 U.S.C. 
§ 856(a) & caption (1986). After all, the statute covers much 
more than manufacturing drugs. 
B. Safehouse’s safe-injection site 
The parties have stipulated to the key facts: Safehouse 
wants to try a new approach to combat the opioid crisis. It plans 
to open the country’s first safe-injection site. Safehouse is 
headed by José Benitez, who also runs Prevention Point Phila-
delphia. Like Prevention Point and other sites, Safehouse will 
care for wounds, offer drug treatment and counseling, refer 
people to social services, distribute overdose-reversal kits, and 
exchange used syringes for clean ones. 
But unlike other sites, Safehouse will also feature a con-
sumption room. Drug users may go there to inject themselves 
with illegal drugs, including heroin and fentanyl. The 
consumption room is what will make Safehouse unique—and 
legally vulnerable. 
When a drug user visits the consumption room, a Safehouse 
staffer will give him a clean syringe as well as strips to test 
drugs for contaminants. Staffers may advise him on sterile in-
jection techniques but will not provide, dispense, or administer 
any controlled drugs. The user must get his drugs before he 
arrives and bring them to Safehouse; he may not share or trade 
them on the premises. The drugs he consumes will be his own. 
After he uses them, Safehouse staffers will watch him for 
signs of overdose. If needed, they will intervene with medical 
care, including respiratory support and overdose-reversal 
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agents. Next, in an observation room, counselors will refer the 
visitor to social services and encourage drug treatment. 
Safehouse hopes to save lives by preventing diseases, coun-
teracting drug overdoses, and encouraging drug treatment. It 
believes that visitors are more likely to accept counseling and 
medical care “after they have consumed drugs and are not ex-
periencing withdrawal symptoms.” App. 685. 
C. Procedural history 
The Government sought a declaratory judgment that 
Safehouse’s consumption room would violate § 856(a)(2). 
Safehouse counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that it 
would not and that applying the statute to Safehouse would vi-
olate either the Commerce Clause or the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA). U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000bb–2000bb-3. 
The Government moved for judgment on the pleadings, and 
the District Court denied the motion. It held that § 856(a)(2) 
does not apply to Safehouse’s proposed consumption room. 
United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 587 (E.D. Pa. 
2019). Rather, it held that someone violates § 856(a)(2) only if 
his purpose is for others to manufacture, distribute, or use ille-
gal drugs on the premises. Id. at 595, 605. And it found that 
Safehouse’s purpose was to offer medical care, encourage 
treatment, and save lives, not to facilitate drug use. Id. at 614. 
Because the statute did not apply, the court did not need to 
reach Safehouse’s Commerce Clause or RFRA defenses. After 
the parties stipulated to a set of facts, the court entered a final 
declaratory judgment for Safehouse. The Government now 
15 
appeals. On appeal, Safehouse renews its Commerce Clause 
defense but reserves its RFRA defense for remand. 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The District 
Court’s declaratory judgment has “the force and effect of a fi-
nal judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. “Once [the] district court has 
ruled on all of the issues submitted to it, either deciding them 
or declining to do so, the declaratory judgment is complete, fi-
nal, and appealable.” Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
260 F.3d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 2001). So it does not matter that the 
court did not reach the affirmative defenses. We review the 
court’s reading of the statute and application of the statute to 
Safehouse de novo. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 424 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019). 
II. SAFEHOUSE WILL VIOLATE 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)  
BY KNOWINGLY AND DELIBERATELY 
LETTING VISITORS USE DRUGS 
Section 856(a)(2) makes it illegal to “manage or control” a 
property and then “knowingly and intentionally” open it to vis-
itors “for the purpose of . . . using a controlled substance”: 
(a) Unlawful acts 
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful 
to— 
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any 
place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the 
purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using 
any controlled substance; 
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(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently 
or temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, 
employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly 
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make 
available for use, with or without compensation, the 
place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, 
storing, distributing, or using a controlled sub-
stance. 
 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (emphasis added). This case turns on how 
to construe and apply § 856(a)(2)’s last phrase: “for the purpose 
of . . . .” Safehouse insists that, to violate that paragraph, 
Safehouse itself would need to have the purpose that its visitors 
use drugs. The Government disagrees. It argues that only the 
visitors need that purpose; Safehouse just needs to intention-
ally open its facility to visitors it knows will use drugs there. 
We agree with the Government. To break the law, 
Safehouse need only “knowingly and intentionally” open its 
site to visitors who come “for the purpose of . . . using” drugs. 
The text of the statute focuses on the third party’s purpose, not 
the defendant’s. Even if we read paragraph (a)(2) as Safehouse 
does, its purpose is that the visitors use drugs. That is enough 
to violate paragraph (a)(2). 
A. Under § 856(a)(2), the defendant must knowingly 
and deliberately let another person use his property 
for drug activity. 
Before getting to the disputed requirement of “purpose,” we 
must first discuss the statute’s two other mental states, neither 
of which is really in dispute. To violate (a)(2), a defendant must 
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“knowingly and intentionally . . . make [his property] available 
for use” by a third party for that person’s illegal drug use. The 
first two phrases of (a)(2) focus on the voluntary conduct or 
knowledge of the defendant. The first phrase requires the de-
fendant to “manage or control [a] place.” And the second 
phrase requires the defendant to “knowingly and intentionally 
rent, lease, profit from, or make [the place] available for use” 
for illegal drug activity. The adverbs “knowingly” and “inten-
tionally” introduce this second phrase, modifying the defend-
ant’s making the place available to a third party. In practice, 
this means three things. 
First, the defendant must know that other(s) are or will be 
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using drugs on his 
property. See United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 457–58 
(3d Cir. 2001). For instance, the owner of a building cannot be 
prosecuted if he does not know that others are selling drugs out 
of his building. But the defendant cannot just turn a blind eye 
to rampant drug activity. See United States v. Ramsey, 406 F.3d 
426, 431–32 (7th Cir. 2005). Other courts hold that the owner’s 
willful blindness or deliberate ignorance can suffice. See, e.g., 
United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 192 & n.11 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
Second, the defendant need know only that his tenants or 
customers are selling or using heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, or the 
like. He does not need to know that they are violating the law 
or intend for them to do so. See Bryan v. United States, 524 
U.S. 184, 192–93 (1998); Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 457–58. 
“[I]gnorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal 
charge.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994). Of 
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course, Congress can make it a defense. Id. But it does so spar-
ingly, almost exclusively for tax and regulatory crimes. See 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991) (tax 
crimes); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) 
(misusing food stamps). And when Congress does require 
knowledge of the law, it uses the word “willfully.” Bryan, 524 
U.S. at 191–92 & n.13; Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141–42 (equating 
willfulness with “a purpose to disobey the law”). It did not do 
so here. 
Finally, the defendant must make the place available to oth-
ers “intentionally.” That means deliberately, not accidentally 
or by mistake. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 458. Because paragraph 
(a)(2) predicates liability on a third party’s drug activities, it 
adds this extra intent requirement to shield owners who are not 
complicit. An owner is not liable, for instance, if he knows that 
trespassers are doing drugs but did not invite them and does 
not want them. 
B. Under § 856(a)(2), the defendant need not have the 
purpose of drug activity 
While (a)(2) requires the defendant to act knowingly and 
intentionally, it does not require him to also have another men-
tal state: “purpose.” Paragraph (a)(2) requires someone to have 
a “purpose”—but not the defendant. To get a conviction under 
(a)(2), the government must show only that the defendant’s 
tenant or visitor had a purpose to manufacture, distribute, or 
use drugs. This conclusion follows from the law’s language 
and grammar. It avoids making paragraph (a)(2) redundant of 
(a)(1). It also avoids making (a)(2)’s intent requirement 
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redundant. And it is the conclusion reached by every circuit 
court to consider the issue. 
1. The plain text requires only that the third party have the 
purpose of drug activity. Section 856’s text makes it clear that 
(a)(2)’s “purpose” is not the defendant’s. We see this from the 
way that paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) are written and struc-
tured. 
i. Paragraph (a)(1). The Government does not charge 
Safehouse with violating paragraph (a)(1). But to understand 
its sibling, paragraph (a)(2), we must start with (a)(1): 
[I]t shall be unlawful to— 
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain 
any place, whether permanently or tempo-
rarily,  
for the purpose of manufacturing, distrib-
uting, or using any controlled substance. 
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (line break added; mens rea terms itali-
cized). This paragraph requires just one actor and two sets of 
actions. The actor is the defendant. He “open[s], lease[s], 
rent[s], use[s], or maintain[s] [the] place.” He also has “the pur-
pose of manufacturing, distributing, or using” the drugs. These 
actions do not require a third party. A person can “maintain” 
an apartment or “manufactur[e]” drugs all by himself. Yet this 
paragraph does not forbid third parties. A defendant does not 
have to act alone; he can “us[e]” drugs with a friend or “man-
ufactur[e]” them with a business partner. He can even have his 
employees do that work for him; a kingpin can run a drug 
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empire without ever touching the drugs himself. But even if no 
one joins him in his drug activities, he still falls under (a)(1). 
The inquiry turns on the purpose of the defendant. 
So paragraph (a)(1) bars a person from operating a place 
for his own purpose of illegal drug activity. On this, the parties, 
the District Court, and our sister circuits all agree. For instance, 
a person may not use his bedroom as the base of his drug deal-
ing operation. See United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296–
97 (10th Cir. 1995). He may not manufacture meth in his gar-
age and regularly invite others over to use meth in that garage. 
See United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 
2011). And he certainly may not rent houses to serve as drug 
distribution centers by day and house his street-level drug deal-
ers by night. See United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1083–
85, 1090–94 (11th Cir. 1992).  
ii. Paragraph (a)(2). Now we turn to paragraph (a)(2): 
[I]t shall be unlawful to— 
. . . 
(2) manage or control any place, whether per-
manently or temporarily, either as an owner, 
lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mort-
gagee, and 
knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, 
profit from, or make available for use, with 
or without compensation, the place 
for the purpose of unlawfully manufactur-
ing, storing, distributing, or using a con-
trolled substance. 
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21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (line breaks added; mens rea terms itali-
cized). The District Court read this paragraph, like paragraph 
(a)(1), to require that the defendant act for his own purpose of 
illegal drug activity. But paragraph (a)(2) does not require such 
a high mental state (mens rea). Instead, the defendant need only 
deliberately make his place available to another, knowing that 
this other person has the purpose of illegal drug activity. 
Unlike paragraph (a)(1), paragraph (a)(2) contemplates at 
least two actors: a defendant and a third party. The defendant 
“manage[s] or control[s]” the place, whether “as an owner, les-
see, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee.” He could be a 
landlord, a business owner, or a renter. 
The second actor is some third party: a tenant, a customer, 
or a guest. She is the one who uses or occupies the place. The 
law does not mention this third party, but its verbs require her. 
The landlord must “rent” or “lease” the place out to a tenant. 
For the business owner to “profit from” the place, customers 
must pay him. If a defendant “make[s] [the place] available for 
use,” someone must be there to use it. 
In turn, that third party engages in the drug activity. Para-
graph (a)(2) lays out three sets of actions, corresponding to the 
three phrases broken out separately above. The defendant does 
the first two: he “manage[s] or control[s]” the place, and he 
“rent[s], lease[s], profit[s] from, or make[s] [it] available for 
use.” The third party does the last set of actions: she “manufac-
ture[s], stor[es], distribut[es], or us[es] a controlled substance” 
(or at least has the purpose to do so). For instance, the tenant, 
not the landlord, sells drugs out of the apartment. 
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This third party, we hold, is the one who must act “for the 
purpose of” illegal drug activity. The parties vigorously contest 
this point. But this reading is logical. Paragraph (a)(1) requires 
just the defendant. He must have the purpose of drug activity, 
whether he engages in it by himself or with others. Paragraph 
(a)(2) requires at least two people, adding the third party. She 
performs the drug activity. The phrase “for the purpose of” re-
fers to this new person.  
Thus, a defendant cannot let a friend use his house to weigh 
and package drugs, even if the defendant himself is not in-
volved in the drug ring. See United States v. McCullough, 457 
F.3d 1150, 1157–58, 1161 (10th Cir. 2006). He cannot tell his 
son to stop selling drugs from his trailer, yet let him stay even 
when he keeps selling. See Ramsey, 406 F.3d at 429, 433. And 
he cannot lease storefronts to known drug dealers just because 
he needs the money. See United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 
936, 938 (5th Cir. 1992). 
2. Safehouse’s interpretation would make paragraph 
(a)(2) and “intentionally” redundant. Together, paragraphs 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) compose a coherent package, forbidding dif-
ferent ways of “[m]aintaining [a] drug-involved premises.” 21 
U.S.C. § 856 (caption). Each paragraph sets out a distinct 
crime, separated by a paragraph number, spacing, and a semi-
colon. United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). Each requires a different actor to have the required 
purpose. 
Safehouse’s reading, by contrast, would make paragraph 
(a)(2) redundant of (a)(1). In each, Safehouse says, the defend-
ant himself must have the purpose of drug activity. It concedes 
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that the paragraphs partly overlap. But it argues that (a)(1) co-
vers the crack house’s operator, while only (a)(2) covers a “dis-
tant landlord.” Oral Arg. Tr. 63. This distinction does not hold. 
If each paragraph required just one actor who has the purpose 
of drug activity, the distant landlord would fall under either. 
Safehouse admits that he violates (a)(2). He is guilty under 
(a)(1) too, because he has “rent[ed]” and “maintain[ed]” a 
place for drug activity. Nothing would differentiate (a)(2) from 
(a)(1). 
Safehouse’s other example to distinguish the two para-
graphs fares no better. It postulates an owner who lets her boy-
friend run a crack ring from her apartment while she is at work. 
It says she would violate only (a)(2). Not so. If she does not 
have the purpose of using the apartment for drug sales, 
Safehouse’s reading would exclude her from either paragraph. 
But if she does have that purpose, she would be liable under 
both. 
Thus, on Safehouse’s reading, (a)(2) would do no inde-
pendent work. Recall that a defendant can just as easily violate 
(a)(1) while working with someone else. Both paragraphs 
would require the defendant to have the requisite purpose, so 
(a)(2) would add nothing. That redundancy is fatal. Though 
statutes sometimes overlap, we try to avoid reading one part of 
a statute to make another part surplusage. Yates v. United 
States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015). That is especially true of two 
paragraphs nestled in the same subsection. Id. We will not col-
lapse the two into one. 
Safehouse’s reading would also make paragraph (a)(2)’s in-
tent requirement redundant of its purpose requirement. 
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Congress added the word “intentionally” to paragraph (a)(2) 
but not (a)(1). Intention, like purpose, is a volitional mental 
state; it requires the defendant to will something. One cannot 
have a purpose of unlawful drug activity without intending that 
activity. In paragraph (a)(2), the intent requirement would 
make no sense layered on top of requiring the defendant to 
have the purpose. But it makes sense to require the defendant’s 
intent on top of the third party’s purpose. That protects defend-
ants against liability for mistaken, accidental, or involuntary 
use of their property. 
3. Other circuits read § 856(a) similarly. Finally, six other 
circuits agree with our reading of the two paragraphs. See 
United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam); United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 189–90 (5th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 959–61 (8th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296–97 & n.4 
(10th Cir. 1995). No circuit has held otherwise. 
True, as Safehouse notes, no other circuit has addressed a 
safe-injection site. The other circuits’ cases involved egregious 
drug activity. But these cases all recognize the textual differ-
ence between the defendant’s own purpose under paragraph 
(a)(1) and the third party’s purpose under (a)(2). Safehouse has 
much better intentions. But good intentions cannot override the 
plain text of the statute. 
4. Safehouse’s other arguments are unpersuasive. 
Safehouse raises three objections to the plain reading of the 
text, but they all fail. First, it responds that “for the purpose of” 
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cannot mean two different things in the two sister paragraphs. 
It does not. We presume that “purpose” means the same thing 
in both. Env’t Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 
(2007). But we do not presume that the “purpose” belongs to 
the same actor in each paragraph. 
The difference in phrasing draws that distinction. For in-
stance, paragraph (a)(1) forbids a defendant’s “use” of a place 
“for the purpose of” drug activity. Paragraph (a)(2) forbids a 
defendant’s “mak[ing] [a place] available for use . . . for the 
purpose of” drug activity. In each subsection, “for the purpose 
of” refers back to “use,” its nearest reasonable referent. See 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts 152–53 (2012). Whoever “use[s]” the 
property is the one who must have the purpose. Since the third 
party is the actor who “use[s]” the place in paragraph (a)(2), it 
is her purpose that matters. Those two phrases are worded dif-
ferently because they target use by different actors. 
Second, Safehouse fares no better by citing the rule of len-
ity. We interpret ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the 
defendant. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427. Before we do, though, 
we must exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction. 
Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 787 (2020). And once 
we do that, this statutory text is clear enough, not “grievous[ly] 
ambigu[ous].” United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 173 
(2014) (quoting Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)). 
Finally, Safehouse objects that it would be “extremely odd” 
to tie a defendant’s liability to a third party’s state of mind. Oral 
Arg. Tr. 61. That is not so strange. When a robber holds up a 
cashier with a toy gun, the prosecution must prove that the 
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cashier had a real “fear of injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Or 
in a kidnapping case, to show that the defendant acted “unlaw-
fully,” the prosecution must prove that the victim did not con-
sent to come along. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). And when one mem-
ber of a drug ring goes astray and kills someone, his cocon-
spirators can still be liable for murder. Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–47 (1946). Though only the killer 
has the requisite specific intent to kill, it is enough that his part-
ners in crime could reasonably foresee that he would kill in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Gonzales, 841 
F.3d 339, 351–52 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Alvarez, 755 
F.2d 830, 848–49 (11th Cir. 1985). 
In sum, all that paragraph (a)(2) requires is that the third 
party, not the defendant, have the purpose of drug activity. 
Still, the defendant must have a mental state: he must know-
ingly and willingly let others use his property for drug activity. 
Now we apply this statute to Safehouse. 
C. Section 856(a)(2) applies to Safehouse because its 
visitors will have a significant purpose of drug  
activity 
Everyone agrees that Safehouse satisfies the first two 
phrases of paragraph (a)(2). First, it will “manage [and] con-
trol” the site. Second, it will “intentionally . . . make [its con-
sumption room] available for [visitors’] use,” knowing that 
they will use drugs there. But visitors will come for other rea-
sons too, including Safehouse’s medical and counseling ser-
vices. So the question is whether the visitors’ use of the con-
sumption room will satisfy the third phrase: (a)(2)’s purpose 
requirement. It will. 
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A person’s purpose is his “objective, goal, or end.” Pur-
pose, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is something 
he “sets out to do.” Purpose (def. 1a), Oxford English Diction-
ary (3d ed. 2007). 
People often have multiple purposes. A parent might scold 
a screaming child both to silence her and to teach her how to 
behave in public. But not every purpose satisfies the statute. 
The statute requires the actor to act “for the purpose of” drug 
activity, not just a purpose of drug activity. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) 
(emphasis added). That choice of “the” rather than “a” means 
that not just any purpose will do. The actor’s purpose must be 
more than “merely incidental.” Lancaster, 968 F.2d at 1253. 
But it need not be his “sole purpose.” Shetler, 665 F.3d at 1161. 
Otherwise, Congress would have said “for the sole purpose,” 
as it has elsewhere. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 48(d)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 62; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)(1).  
Since the actor’s purpose must fall somewhere between an 
“incidental” and a “sole” purpose, we think the District Court 
and our sister circuits have it right: the actor need have only a 
“significant purpose” of drug activity. United States v. Russell, 
595 F.3d 633, 643 (6th Cir. 2010). If he has a “significant pur-
pose” of drug use, he violates the statute, even if he also has 
other significant purposes. United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 
F.3d 340, 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1997). 
Safehouse’s visitors will have the significant purpose of 
drug activity. True, some people will visit Safehouse just for 
medical services or counseling. Even so, Safehouse’s main at-
traction is its consumption room. Visitors will bring their own 
drugs to use them there. And many of Safehouse’s services will 
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revolve around the visitors’ drug use there. The clean syringes 
and fentanyl strips will let them inject drugs more securely. 
The respiratory support and overdose-reversal agents will re-
duce their chances of dying of an overdose. And the medical 
and counseling care will be offered after they have used drugs. 
When a visitor comes to Safehouse to prevent an overdose, that 
reason is bound up with the significant purpose of doing drugs. 
That satisfies the statute. 
Safehouse worries that our reading will punish parents for 
housing their drug-addicted children, or homeless shelters for 
housing known drug users. It will not. People use these places 
to eat, sleep, and bathe. The drug use in homes or shelters 
would be incidental to living there. But for most people, using 
drugs at Safehouse will not be incidental to going there. It will 
be a significant purpose of their visit.  
D. In any event, Safehouse has a significant purpose 
that its visitors do drugs 
Even if paragraph (a)(2) looked to Safehouse’s own pur-
pose, Safehouse would violate the statute. For Safehouse itself 
has a significant purpose that its visitors use heroin, fentanyl, 
and the like. 
Safehouse vigorously contests this point. As it stresses, one 
of Safehouse’s purposes is to stop overdoses and save lives. 
Other purposes include preventing disease and providing med-
ical care. But as Safehouse conceded at oral argument, “there 
can be multiple purposes” that a defendant pursues at once. 
Oral Arg. Tr. 53. Plus, motive is distinct from mens rea. A de-
fendant can be guilty even if he has the best of motives. A child 
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who steals bread to feed his hungry sister has still committed 
theft. The son who helps his terminally ill mother end her life 
has still committed murder. 
One of Safehouse’s significant purposes is to allow drug 
use. Start with the facility’s name: Safehouse calls it a “con-
sumption room” or “safe-injection site.” App. 683–84. It ex-
pects visitors to bring heroin, fentanyl, or the like with them to 
use on-site. It will offer visitors clean syringes and fentanyl 
strips and advise visitors on how to inject heroin or fentanyl 
safely. Safehouse even foresees a benefit to this on-site drug 
use: it thinks visitors will be more likely to accept drug treat-
ment “after they have consumed drugs and are not experienc-
ing withdrawal symptoms.” App. 685. 
In short, Safehouse will offer visitors a space to inject them-
selves with drugs. Even on its own reading of purpose, that is 
enough to violate the statute. 
E. We cannot rewrite the statute to exclude the 
safe-injection site 
Finally, Safehouse asks us to look beyond the statute’s text 
to consider Congress’s intent. The public-policy debate is im-
portant, but it is not one for courts. If the text of a criminal 
statute “is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce 
it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 485 (1917).  
1. We apply the plain text, not Congress’s expectations. 
First, Safehouse objects that Congress targeted crack houses, 
but never expected the law to apply to safe-injection sites. That 
is true but irrelevant. See Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 
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U.S. 206, 212 (1998). Statutes often reach beyond the principal 
evil that animated them. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). For instance, though Congress 
meant RICO to target mobsters, it reaches far beyond them to 
legitimate businesses as well. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (analyzing the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68). 
A court’s job is to parse texts, not psychoanalyze lawmak-
ers. “[W]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask 
only what the statute means.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. 
Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Justice Jackson quoting Justice Holmes). At least 
when the text is clear, we will not look beyond it to lawmakers’ 
statements, because “legislative history is not the law.” Id.; ac-
cord Pellegrino v. TSA, 937 F.3d 164, 179 (3d Cir. 2019) (en 
banc). The words on the page, not the intent of any legislator, 
go through bicameralism and presentment and become law. 
Here, the statute’s plain text covers safe-injection sites. We 
look no further. 
2. Congress’s recent efforts to combat addiction did not 
revoke the statute. Next, Safehouse and its amici claim that our 
reading of the statute is bad policy. On average, nearly three 
Philadelphians die of drug overdoses each day. A consumption 
room, they argue, could save those lives. And the Government 
has spent lots of time and money fighting the opioid crisis. In 
2016, Congress passed the Comprehensive Addiction and Re-
covery Act, which creates federal grants to treat drug addiction 
and prevent overdoses. Pub. L. No. 114-198, § 103, 130 Stat. 
695, 699–700 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1536). Since then, it has 
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banned federal funding of syringe-exchange programs but au-
thorized an exception. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 520, 129 Stat. 2242, 2652.  
Safehouse asks us to read the Act to “[h]armonize[ ]” it with 
these federal efforts. Appellees’ Br. 38. But to do that, we 
would have to rewrite the statute. These laws say nothing about 
safe-injection sites, and § 856(a)(2)’s plain text forbids them. If 
that ban undermines Congress’s current efforts to fight opioids, 
Congress must fix it; we cannot. 
III. APPLYING § 856(a)(2) TO SAFEHOUSE IS A VALID  
EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S POWER OVER INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 
Having held that Safehouse’s safe-injection site would vio-
late § 856(a)(2), we turn to its affirmative defense under the 
Commerce Clause. Safehouse argues that Congress lacks the 
power to criminalize its local, noncommercial behavior. After 
all, it will not charge visitors to use the consumption room. But 
the Supreme Court foreclosed that argument in Gonzales v. 
Raich, rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to a different 
section of the Controlled Substances Act. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
Raich clarifies that Congress can regulate local, noncommer-
cial activity when that activity will affect a national market. 
Even though Safehouse’s consumption room will be local and 
free, the Act bans it as part of shutting down the national mar-
ket for drugs. The Commerce Clause, together with the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, gives Congress the power to do that. 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18. 
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A. Congress can regulate local activities either (1) if 
they are economic and, taken together, substantially 
affect interstate commerce, or (2) as part of a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme 
Using its commerce power, Congress can regulate the 
“channels of interstate commerce”; “instrumentalities,” peo-
ple, and “things in interstate commerce”; and “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). That last category can 
cover local activity and thus risks blurring the line “between 
what is truly national and what is truly local.” Id. at 567–68. 
To hold that line, we demand that the local activity Congress 
regulates be either (1) economic or else (2) covered by a 
broader scheme to regulate commerce. See id. at 559–61. 
Either route suffices. 
1. Congress can regulate local economic activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Federal law may reg-
ulate local activities if they are economic and, as a “class of 
activities,” they substantially affect interstate commerce. 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 151 (1971)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60. A court does not 
decide for itself that a class of activity has substantial economic 
effects. We ask only whether Congress had a rational basis to 
think so. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
Activities can count as economic even if they are not com-
mercial. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. That is because, even without 
buying or selling, some local activities can collectively affect 
national supply and demand. Thus, in Wickard v. Filburn, the 
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Supreme Court upheld a law capping how much wheat a farmer 
could grow to feed his own livestock, bake his own bread, and 
plant his next year’s crop. 317 U.S. 111, 114, 127–28 (1942). 
In the aggregate, it reasoned, excess homegrown wheat could 
lower demand, compete with wheat on the market, and so sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Id.  
2. Congress can regulate noneconomic activities only as 
part of a larger regulatory scheme. Congress’s power to regu-
late noneconomic activities, like many traditionally local 
crimes, is more limited. “Congress may [not] regulate non-
economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). For instance, Congress 
cannot ban possessing guns near schools just because violent 
crime might raise insurance rates, hinder education, and thus 
dampen economic production. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64. Nor 
can it ban violence against women based on how it might harm 
employment and the economy. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614–15. 
That is the job of state and local legislatures, not Congress. 
But Congress can regulate traditionally local, noneconomic 
activities as part of a larger regulatory scheme. The laws in 
Lopez and Morrison were single-subject statutes, not part of 
regulating interstate markets. By contrast, Congress can reach 
local, noneconomic activities (like simple possession) as “part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regu-
latory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. For example, when 
this Court faced a federal ban on possessing certain machine 
guns, we upheld it. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 274 
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(3d Cir. 1996). That law, unlike the one in Lopez, sought to halt 
interstate gun trafficking. Id. at 282–83. To shut down the 
interstate market in machine guns, it had to reach intrastate 
possession too. Id. By the same token, Congress can ban even 
intrastate possession of child pornography. United States v. Ro-
dia, 194 F.3d 465, 479 (3d Cir. 1999). 
When Congress regulates local noneconomic activities as 
part of a scheme, it need only choose means that are “ ‘reason-
ably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 
(1941)). 
Having discussed the two bases for regulating local activi-
ties, we can now apply them. As the next two sections explain, 
both the comprehensive-scheme and aggregate-economic-
effect rationales independently justify § 856’s ban. 
B. Congress can ban local drug-involved premises as 
part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme  
Whether providing drug-involved premises counts as eco-
nomic activity or not, Congress can regulate it. The drug mar-
ket is national and international. Congress has found that this 
trade poses a national threat. Thus, it passed the Controlled 
Substances Act, a scheme to suppress or tightly control this 
market. The Act properly seeks to shut down the market for 
Schedule I and unprescribed Schedule II–V drugs. Because 
Congress passed a valid scheme to regulate the interstate drug 
trade, § 856 is constitutional as long as it is “reasonably 
adapted” to that scheme. Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., 
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concurring) (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 121). And it is. To 
bolster the Act’s scheme, Congress can reach local premises 
where drug activities happen. 
1. The Controlled Substances Act is a scheme to tightly 
control the interstate drug market. Drugs are big business. In 
2016 alone, Americans spent $146 billion on cannabis, co-
caine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Gregory Midgette et al., 
RAND Corp., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 
2006–2016, at xiv tbl. S.2 (2019). Congress has recognized that 
much of this traffic flows in interstate and international com-
merce. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3). It addressed that market in the Act. 
To control drug manufacture, sale, and possession, the Act 
creates a “closed regulatory system.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 13. 
Because Schedule I drugs have no accepted medical use, the 
Act bans them entirely. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). For other 
drugs that have some accepted uses but a “potential for abuse” 
(those in schedules II–V), the Act requires a prescription. 
§§ 812(b)(2)(A), (3)(A), (4)(A), (5)(A), 844(a). This scheme 
seeks to shut down the markets in Schedule I and unprescribed 
Schedule II–V drugs. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 24. That goal 
is valid, as the power to regulate a market includes the power 
to ban it. Id. at 19 n.29. 
2. Congress can serve this goal by reaching intrastate ac-
tivities. The national drug market is bound up with local activ-
ities. Drugs produced locally are often sold elsewhere; drugs 
sold or possessed locally have usually been imported from 
elsewhere. § 801(3). Even local possession and sale “contribute 
to swelling the interstate market.” § 801(4). So to control the 
interstate market, the Act reaches intrastate activities. 
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Raich confirms that Congress can do that. Raich upheld the 
Act’s ban on local production and possession of marijuana for 
personal medical use. 545 U.S. at 9. Unlike the laws in Lopez 
and Morrison, this ban was part of a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme to shut down the interstate market in marijuana. Id. at 
19, 23–24. Drugs are fungible. Id. at 18. Local drugs are hard 
to distinguish from imported ones and can be diverted into the 
interstate market. Id. at 22. Congress rationally believed that 
failing to regulate intrastate drugs “would leave a gaping hole 
in the [Act].” Id. So it was necessary and proper to enact a flat 
ban, with no intrastate exception. Id.; id. at 34 (Scalia, J., con-
curring).  
3. Section 856 is a key part of the Act’s comprehensive reg-
ulatory scheme. At oral argument, Safehouse sought to distin-
guish consuming drugs from providing a place to consume 
them. But just as Congress regulates the drug activities, it can 
also regulate places where those activities are likely to flourish. 
Congress added § 856 to plug a “gaping hole” in the Act that 
made it harder to stop drug use and dealing at crack houses and 
the like. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
Section 856 is reasonably adapted to control drug manufac-
ture, sale, and possession. Consider state laws that forbid 
BYOB restaurants to let minors drink alcohol on-site. See, e.g., 
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:33-27(a)(3). Of course, minors themselves 
may not drink in public. Id. § 2C:33-15(a). And the restaurants 
would not be providing the alcohol, only the space and glasses. 
Yet states still punish them if the minors drink there. Why? 
Because the ban makes it harder for minors to drink. If restau-
rateurs know that they could face steep fines for tolerating 
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underage drinking, they will prevent it from happening. So too 
here. Just as local drug possession “swell[s] the interstate 
[drug] traffic,” clamping down on local drug use helps restrict 
that market. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3), (4). 
We could stop here. Because § 856 is part of the Act’s com-
prehensive regulatory scheme, Congress has the power to ban 
even local, noneconomic activity that would undercut that 
scheme. But another ground independently supports the Act: it 
regulates economic activity that could, in the aggregate, sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 
C. Congress had a rational basis to believe that 
making properties available for drug use will have 
substantial economic effects  
Even if § 856 were not part of a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, Congress could still regulate the activities it covers. 
Safehouse argues that making a local safe-injection site avail-
able for free is noneconomic. But Raich forecloses that argu-
ment. 
1. Making properties available for drug use is economic 
activity. Raich defined “economics” broadly as “the produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” 545 U.S. 
at 25–26 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Diction-
ary 720 (1966)) (emphasis added). These are all activities that 
affect national supply and demand and thus interstate com-
merce. So producing, distributing, and consuming drugs are 
“quintessentially economic” activities. Id. Even intrastate 
growing of marijuana for home consumption is economic, 
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because it could substantially affect the national marijuana 
market. Id. at 19, 25–26. 
To be sure, Safehouse will not itself consume drugs. But it 
will create a “consumption room,” a dedicated space for 
streams of visitors to use drugs. “[T]here is an established, and 
lucrative, interstate market” for those drugs. Id. at 26. Opening 
a space for consuming drugs will encourage users to come do 
so. Making consumption easier and safer will lower its risk and 
so could increase consumption. More drug consumption would 
create more market demand. Just as “home consumption [of] a 
fungible commodity” is economic activity that can substan-
tially affect the national market, so too is hosting consumption. 
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.  
It makes no difference that Safehouse will let its visitors 
come for free. Wickard grew wheat to feed his own livestock 
and bake his own bread. 317 U.S. at 114. And though one of 
the drug users in Raich grew her own marijuana and another 
was given it as a gift, that did not matter. 545 U.S. at 7. Eco-
nomic activity is broader than commercial activity; it need not 
involve buying and selling. Congress validly banned these non-
commercial uses to control supply and demand in the drug 
market. Raich, 545 U.S. 22–23; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28. 
That was necessary and proper. Congress had the power to reg-
ulate the whole class of drug activities, and courts cannot “ex-
cise” individual cases from that class just because they are 
“trivial.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (quoting Perez v. United States, 
402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)). 
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2. Congress has a rational basis to believe that this activ-
ity, as a class, substantially affects interstate commerce. Con-
gress could find that maintaining drug-involved premises, as a 
class, substantially affects commerce. Drug dealers may well 
congregate near Safehouse, increasing the drug trade and argu-
ably drug demand. True, Safehouse argues that its site will not 
increase drug demand, as visitors must buy their drugs before 
arriving. And amici dispute whether safe-injection sites in-
crease drug use and trafficking. That empirical and policy de-
bate is for Congress, not courts. It is enough that Congress 
could rationally find a causal link between drug-involved 
premises as a class and commerce. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
Congressional findings confirm common sense. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801(3)–(6). Drugs typically flow through interstate markets 
before someone possesses them. § 801(3)(C). And intrastate 
possession helps swell the interstate market. § 801(4). So reg-
ulating intrastate activity is necessary and proper to clamp 
down on the interstate market. To be sure, these findings in the 
Act predate § 856, and they do not specifically discuss drug-
involved premises. But we may consider findings from prior 
legislation. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 474 n.4; Rybar, 103 F.3d at 281. 
And “Congress [need not] make particularized findings in or-
der to legislate.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 21. 
 In short, Congress can regulate Safehouse both to complete 
the Act’s comprehensive regulatory scheme and to stop eco-
nomic activity that, in the aggregate, could substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  
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* * * * * 
The opioid crisis is a grave problem that calls for creative 
solutions. Safehouse wants to experiment with one. Its goal, 
saving lives, is laudable. But it is not our job to opine on 
whether its experiment is wise. The statute forbids opening and 
maintaining any place for visitors to come use drugs. Its words 
are not limited to crack houses. Congress has chosen one ra-
tional approach to reducing drug use and trafficking: a flat ban. 
We cannot rewrite the statute. Only Congress can. So we will 








ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and dissenting in 
judgment. 
 
 The Majority’s decision is sui generis:  It concludes that 
8 U.S.C. §  856(a)(2)—unlike § 856(a)(1) or any other federal 
criminal statute—criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct, 
based solely on the “purpose” of a third party who is neither 
named nor described in the statute.  The text of section 
856(a)(2) cannot support this novel construction.  Moreover, 
even if Safehouse’s “purpose” were the relevant standard, 
Safehouse does not have the requisite purpose.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully dissent.1 
 
I 
 Despite the ongoing public-health crisis caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, we cannot forget that the United States 
is also in the middle of an opioid epidemic.  “Safehouse 
intends to prevent as many [opioid-related] deaths as possible 
through a medical and public health approach to overdose 
prevention.”2  Safehouse is prepared to provide a wide range 
of services desperately needed in Philadelphia and routinely 
provided at Safehouse’s companion facility, Prevention Point 
Philadelphia, including: 
clean syringe exchange services, primary 
 
1 I concur with the Majority’s rejection of Safehouse’s argument that 
Congress cannot regulate its conduct under the Commerce Clause. 
2 Appx. 116. 
 
2 
medical care, an HIV clinic, a Hepatitis C clinic, 
wound care and education on safer injection 
techniques, overdose prevention education, 
overdose reversal kits and distribution, housing, 
meals, mail services, Medication-Assisted 
Treatment, and drug recovery and treatment 
services.3 
 The government takes no issue with any of these 
services.  Instead, it argues that Safehouse should not be 
permitted to open its doors because of one additional service 
that it will provide:  A Consumption Room.  Specifically, 
Safehouse will provide “medically supervised consumption 
and observation” so that “[t]hose who are at high risk of 
overdose death would stay within immediate reach of urgent, 
lifesaving medical care.”4  “Medical supervision at the time of 
consumption ensures that opioid receptor antagonists such as 
Naloxone, and other respiratory and supportive treatments like 
oxygen, will be immediately available to the drug user in the 
event of an overdose.”5  Significantly, no one is required to use 
the Consumption Room to be eligible for any of Safehouse’s 
other services,6 nor will Safehouse provide, store, handle, or 
encourage the use of drugs, or allow others to distribute drugs 
on its property.   
 
3 Id. at 683. 
4 Id. at 116. 
5 Id. 
6 The Safehouse Model, SAFEHOUSEPHILLY.COM, 
https://www.safehousephilly.org/about/ the-safehouse-model (last 
accessed Nov. 17, 2020) (“Upon arrival, participants may choose to 




 In other words, Safehouse is a drug treatment facility 
that also seeks to provide much needed overdose care to drug 
users.  If these users are denied access to a Consumption Room, 
they will still use drugs -- and possibly die on the street.  
Philadelphia’s police and mobile emergency services (EMS) 
already attempt to provide rescue services for users who pass 
out on the streets.  Often, the Police and EMS cannot do so in 
a timely manner.  Instead of patrolling the streets for users who 
have overdosed, Safehouse wants to save lives indoors.   
 
At oral argument, the government conceded that 
Safehouse could provide the exact same services it plans to 
provide in the Consumption Room if it did not do so indoors—
if, for instance, it provided a Consumption Room inside a 
mobile van.  Yet, according to the Majority’s interpretation of 
section 856(a)(2), Safehouse would be committing a federal 
crime, punishable by twenty years’ imprisonment, if the 
Consumption Room services were provided inside a building, 
rather than in a mobile van, parked in front.  I cannot interpret 
section 856(a)(2) to reach such a result. 
 
II 
 At oral argument, the government conceded that section 
856(a) is poorly written.  Indeed, it is nearly incomprehensible.  
Rather than construe this ambiguous statute narrowly, 
however, the Majority opts for broad criminal liability, arguing 
that an organization violates the statute if it makes its property 
available to a third party, knowing that the third party has “the 
purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or 
using a controlled substance.”7  I disagree with such a 
 
7 18 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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construction of the statute.  I know of no statute, other that 
section 856(a)(2), in which the “purpose” of an unnamed third 
party would be the factor that determines the mens rea 
necessary for a defendant to violate the statute.  This 
problematic construction is particularly evident here because 
the parties agree that the “purpose” in section 856(a)(1) refers 
to the defendant’s “purpose.” 
 
A 
 This divergence of interpretation violates the rules of 
statutory construction:  “identical words used in different parts 
of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same 
meaning.”8  The Majority offers no reason to disregard this 
presumption.  And to the extent that there is any ambiguity, the 
legislative history goes against the Majority.  This precise issue 
was addressed in the floor debates of the 2003 amendments to 
section 856(a):  Then-Senator Joseph Biden stated that “rogue 
promoters” charged under the statute must “not only know that 
there is drug activity at their event but also hold the event for 
the purpose of illegal drug use or distribution. . . . Let me be 
clear.  Neither current law nor my bill seeks to punish a 
promoter for the behavior of their patrons.”9 
 
 The Majority also construes section (a)(2)’s mens rea 
requirement unlike any other federal criminal statute.  Indeed, 
the Majority has not identified a single statute that criminalizes 
otherwise innocent conduct—here, lawfully making your 
property “available for use”—solely because of the subjective 
thoughts of a third party not mentioned in the statute.   
 
8 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). 
9 149 Cong. Rec. S1678 (emphasis added). 
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 At oral argument, the government suggested that 
conspiracy requires proof of third-party intent.  True, but 
conspiracy statutes use the word “conspire,” which refers to a 
third party and that party’s purpose.  For centuries, 
“conspiracy” has had a well-accepted common law meaning 
that we still use today:  an “agreement,” “combination,” or 
“confederacy” of multiple people.10  “When Congress uses a 
common law term . . . we generally presume that it intended to 
adopt the term’s widely-accepted common law meaning . . ..”11  
Moreover, conspiracy is a specific-intent crime12 that requires 
a defendant to share and agree to facilitate a co-conspirator’s 
illicit purpose.13  By contrast, the Majority’s construction of 
 
10 United States v. Hinman, 26 F. Cas. 324, 325 (C.C.D.N.J. 1831) 
(No. 15,370); accord United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (“[A defendant] cannot conspire 
alone.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136 n.19 (“To 
constitute a conspiracy . . . there must be at least two persons 
implicated in it.”); see also State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 334 
(Md. 1821) (“[I]f combinations for any of the purposes mentioned 
in the statute, were punishable at all, it could only have been on the 
ground, that both the offence of conspiracy (eo nomine), and the 
punishment, were known to the law anterior to the enactment of the 
statute . . ..”). 
11 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1998); accord 
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997). 
12 Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016); United 
States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999); accord 
United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 369–70 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(“[T]he defendant [must] join[] the agreement knowing of its 
objectives and with the intention of furthering or facilitating 
them.”). 
13 See United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether Tyson and Morrell agreed to 
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section 856(a)(2) does not require a defendant to have any 
particular purpose whatsoever; it is the third party’s purpose 
that is unlawful. And, unlike in a conspiracy, the government 
specifically argues that intent to facilitate is not necessary. 
 
 Nor is the Majority’s construction of section 856(a)(2) 
similar to Pinkerton liability.14  Pinkerton allows for liability 
based on a coconspirator’s completed acts,15 not her thoughts.  
Moreover, those acts must be a foreseeable part or 
consequence of a conspiracy that the defendant intentionally 
entered.16  Finally, the penalties for conspiracy and Pinkerton 
liability are usually limited to those available for the 
underlying crimes.17  By contrast, a section 856(a)(2) 
 
achieve the conspiracy’s ends.”); United States v. Coleman, 811 
F.3d 804, 808 (3d Cir. 1987). 
14 See Nov. 16, 2020 Tr. at 65:23–66:2. 
15 See United States v. Ramos, 147 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(Millett, J., concurring in per curium opinion) (“Pinkerton liability . 
. .  relies on the imputation of co-conspirators’ completed 
offenses.”). 
16 See United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1997). 
17 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Any person who attempts or conspires 
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”); 
United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2008).  But see 
18 U.S.C. § 371 (providing for five-year maximum for conspiracies 
against the United States, which may be committed without an 
underlying criminal object); see also United States v. Conley, 92 
F.3d 157, 163–65 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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defendant may receive up to twenty years’ imprisonment, 
while the third party could be exposed to as little as one year.18 
 
B 
 The Majority’s construction wreaks havoc with the rest 
of the statute.  The Majority relies on out-of-circuit decisions, 
beginning with United States v. Chen,19 holding that “under § 
856(a)(2), the person who manages or controls the building and 
then rents to others, need not have the express purpose in doing 
so that drug related activity take place; rather such activity is 
engaged in by others (i.e., others have the purpose).”20  Chen 
and its progeny did not explain their leap from the (likely 
correct) conclusion that the illicit “activity is engaged in by 
others” to their (incorrect) conclusion that the defendant need 
not have an illicit purpose.     
 
 Instead, Chen and its progeny stated only that a contrary 
interpretation would render either section (a)(1) or (2) 
“superfluous.”  Unsurprisingly, Chen and its progeny did not 
explain that conclusion.  In fact, they contradict each other as 
to which subsection would be rendered superfluous:  The Chen 
court stated that section (a)(2) would be superfluous, whereas 
 
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (“Any person who [possesses a controlled 
substance] may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more 
than 1 year, and shall be fined a minimum of $1,000, or both . . . .”). 
19 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990). 
20 Chen, 913 F.2d at 190 (citing United States v. Burnside, 855 F.2d 
863 (Table) (9th Cir. 1988)); accord United States v. Tebeau, 713 
F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 
197–98 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 




other courts of appeals have stated that both sections would 
“entirely overlap” and “have no separate meaning.”21 
 
 In any event, the text of the statute demonstrates that all 
these courts of appeals are wrong.  When Chen was decided, 
the only overlap between the two sections was the phrase “for 
the purpose of.”22  In other words, Chen and its progeny 
decided that, to avoid superfluity, the only words that were the 
same between the two sections must have different meanings.  
There is no rule of construction that supports or even permits 
such a reading.   
 
 Rather, the distinction between sections (a)(1) and (2) is 
in their respective actus reus requirements.  Section (a)(1) has 
one actus reus element; section (a)(2) has two.  Before 2003, 
those elements did not overlap at all; the 2003 amendments 
created only minor overlap by adding “rent” and “lease” to 
section (a)(1).  I do not see why we should twist the text of the 
statute based on the potential overlap of two words,23 let alone 
why Chen did so before any overlap existed.   
 
 In sum, the Majority construes sections 856(a)(1) and 
(2)’s identical “purpose” elements differently but holds that 
their different actus reus elements are identical.  That need not 
be the case.  For example, section (a)(1) would be violated 
where a property owner sells drugs from his home but does not 
let others use it; section (a)(2) would not.  Section (a)(2) would 
 
21 Tamez, 941 F.2d at 774; accord Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960. 
22 Even the listed purposes are not identical:  Unlike § (a)(1), § (a)(2) 
includes “storing” controlled substances. 
23 Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 n.4 (2014) 
(explaining that even “substantial” overlap between sections of a 
criminal statute “is not uncommon”). 
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be violated where a rave operator encourages drug dealers to 
attend events to increase attendance; section (a)(1) would not.  
Because Safehouse’s construction better comports with the 
statute’s text and does not render either section completely 
superfluous, I would adopt it. 
 
C 
 The Majority’s construction also violates the “deeply 
rooted rule of statutory construction” that we must avoid 
“unintended or absurd results.”24   
 
i 
 As Safehouse correctly argues, under the Majority’s 
construction, parents could violate the statute by allowing their 
drug-addicted adult son to live and do drugs in their home even 
if their only purpose in doing so was to rescue him from an 
overdose.  Conceding that its reading of section (a)(2) cannot 
be taken literally, the Majority concludes that a defendant 
cannot be guilty where drug use is merely “incidental” to the 
guest’s other purposes.  Thus, the hypothetical parents would 
not violate the statute because their son’s drug use was 
incidental to his use of the home as a residence.  By trying to 
assure us that the hypothetical parents would not violate the 
statute, the Majority implicitly acknowledges that such a result 
would be impermissibly absurd.  Although I agree that 
 
24 United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (Ambro, 
J.); accord United States v. Bankoff, 613 F.3d 358, 369 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2010) (Ambro, J.) (explaining that assuming Congress was unaware 
of the terms used in one statute when enacting another statute 
“would lead to an absurd result”).  
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incidental purposes do not trigger the statute, absurd results are 
unavoidable under the Majority’s construction. 
 
 The Majority relies on the consensus of other courts of 
appeals that a defendant’s “casual” drug use in his home does 
not violate the original version of section 856(a)(1) because the 
drug use was incidental to the purpose for which he maintained 
the property, i.e., as a residence.25  Neither the Majority nor the 
cases it cites define “incidental.”  Fortunately, we have.  In 
United States v. Hayward,26 we adopted an incidental-purpose 
test for 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which made it unlawful to “travel 
in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in sex with a 
minor.”  We held that illicit sexual activity must be “a 
significant or motivating purpose of the travel across state or 
foreign boundaries,” rather than merely “incidental” to the 
travel.27  Even assuming that other courts of appeals’ gloss on 
“maintain” in section (a)(1) survived the 2003 amendment28 
and comports with Hayward, it does not neatly apply to a 
 
25 E.g., United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
26 359 F.3d 631 (3d Cir. 2004) (Garth & Ambro, J.). 
27 Hayward, 359 F.3d at 638 (emphasis added); accord United States 
v. Vang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 1997).  Although “for the 
purpose of” in § 2434(b) was later amended explicitly to “with a 
motivating purpose,” the legislative history does not indicate that 
Congress intended to increase the government’s burden of proof.  
28 That amendment added “use” to § 856(a)(1).  Other circuits have 
continued to assume—correctly, I think—that using drugs in one’s 
own home still does not violate § (a)(1).  See United States v. 
Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1164 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The amendments 
increase the possibility that § 856(a)(1) would be unconstitutionally 
vague if construed expansively. What is meant by ‘use’ of ‘any place 
... temporarily’ is, for example, certainly far from clear.”). 
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guest’s purpose in “us[ing]” property under section (a)(2) or 
avoid the absurd results inherent in the Majority’s construction. 
 
 The Majority assumes that the son’s purpose in moving 
in with his parents was to use the home as a residence.  Not 
necessarily.  Although the parents likely “maintain” their home 
for the purpose of living in it, their son may be motivated by 
many purposes to “use” it.  If the son could not do drugs there, 
would he still move in?  Alternatively, the son might already 
have a home (or be indifferent to being homeless) but 
begrudgingly accepted his parents’ invitation to move in with 
them because he shared their concern about overdosing.  Like 
Safehouse’s participants, the son would ‘use” the home 
because he was motivated by an “unlawful” purpose 
(supervised drug use) that was not incidental to his residency 
in the home, and the parents knew it.  Under the Majority’s 
construction, the parents were operating a crack house.  That 
cannot be what the statute intends to say.  Or suppose the son 
intended to do drugs there once, steal his mother’s jewelry, and 
run away.  If the parents were reasonably sure that he would 
run away but gave him a chance anyway, have they violated 
the statute under Chen’s deliberate-ignorance standard?  The 
Majority’s construction suggests so, particularly if this was the 
son’s second or third chance.  And under the Majority’s 
construction, the parents would certainly violate section (a)(2) 
if they invited their son to do drugs in their home under 
supervision but not live there; this result is far afield from the 
crack houses and raves targeted by the statute.   
 
Even apart from the hypothetical parents, absurd results 
abound under the Majority’s construction.  For example, the 
Majority would criminalize a vacationing homeowner who 
pays a house sitter but also allows the sitter to smoke marijuana 
 
12 
in his home.  If the homeowner knew that the sitter cared less 
about the pay than about having a place to smoke marijuana, 
housesitting is the incidental use.  At oral argument, the 
government contended that drug use in these circumstances 
would still be an “incidental” purpose because violating the 
statute somehow depended on the number of people that the 
defendant allowed to use the property.  The statute does not 
mention a numeric threshold.  The Majority does not explain 
why a guest’s purpose depends on the number of persons 
sharing that purpose, and any threshold would necessarily 
involve arbitrary line-drawing.   
 
 The Majority would also criminalize homeless shelters 
where the operators know their clients will use drugs on the 
property.  Although the government argues that the shelter, like 
the parents, would be protected by the incidental-purpose test, 
it again just assumes that “the people who stay [at the shelter] 
have housing as their primary purpose.”29  Again, not 
necessarily.  An operator of a homeless shelter may know (or 
be deliberately ignorant of the fact) that some clients will stay 
at the shelter because they want a concealed place to use drugs 
and to sleep off the high.  In other words, if they were 
prevented from using drugs there, some of them might not go 
there at all. 
 
 Throughout these proceedings the government has 
followed the statute’s text only selectively.  As yet another 
example, the government insists that “place” includes only 
“real property.”30  Thus, the government concedes that 
Safehouse could provide a Consumption Room in a mobile van 
 
29 Gov’t’s Reply at 15. 
30 Nov. 16, 2020 Tr. at 34:4–35:7. 
 
13 
parked outside its facility.  Although that hypothetical does not 
directly implicate the “purpose” element, the government’s 
response when pressed on this hypothetical at oral argument is 
significant:  The government conceded that it “ha[sn’t] thought 
. . . enough” about the potential consequences of its 
construction of the statute.31  As shown above, the 
government’s lack of thought is self-evident.  In fact, the 
government’s construction of the statute, adopted by the 
Majority here, is intolerably sweeping.  No amount of a textual 
gloss will save it. 
 
ii 
 The Majority’s construction also conflicts with other 
federal policies.  For example, HUD strongly discourages 
landlords from evicting certain classes of tenants for drug use 
alone.32  The government again invokes the incidental-purpose 
test, arguing that HUD’s “guidance regarding drug use . . . aims 
to connect homeless individuals to housing ‘without 
preconditions and barriers to entry.’”33  Under the Majority’s 
construction, however, HUD’s purpose is irrelevant.  Nor is the 
landlord protected because this is a “residential example[]”34:  
Even if the landlord knows that a tenant uses the property 
primarily for drug binges, HUD expects the landlord to 
continue leasing the property to the tenant unless the tenant 
otherwise violates the lease. 
 
31 Id. at 37:7–21. 
32 HUD, HOUSING FIRST IN PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING at 3 
(July 2014), available at 
https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/Housing-First-
Permanent-Supportive-Housing-Brief.pdf. 




 The Majority’s construction is also inconsistent with 
congressional grants for sanitary syringe programs.  In some 
instances, this funding can be used to purchase syringes for the 
injection of controlled substances,35 and the CDC strongly 
encourages these programs to “[p]rovi[de] . . . naloxone to 
reverse opioid overdoses.”36  Naloxone is indicated to reverse 
“opioid depression, including respiratory depression.”37  By 
explicitly acknowledging that these programs will provide 
syringes for controlled substances and encouraging them to 
provide medication used to treat ongoing overdoses, Congress 
clearly envisioned that drug use would likely occur on or 
immediately adjacent to the programs’ properties.  In other 
words, Congress is knowingly funding conduct that, according 
to the Majority, is a crime punishable by twenty years’ 
imprisonment.   
 
The Majority does not dispute that this would be 
anomalous.  Instead, the government argues that “Congress’s 
failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a 
more general statutory rule” does not “create[] a tacit 
exception.”38  But that begs the question.  Safehouse argues 
 
35 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 
114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, § 520. 
36 CDC, PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING CERTAIN 
COMPONENTS OF SYRINGE SERVICES PROGRAMS, 2016 at 2 (2016), 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/risk/cdc-hiv-syringe-
exchange-services.pdf. 
37 FDA, PRODUCT INSERT, NALOXONE HYDROCHLORIDE INJECTION 
SOLUTION (Sept. 9, 2020), available at 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/spl/data/5ac302c7-4e5c-4a38-
93ea-4fab202b84ee/5ac302c7-4e5c-4a38-93ea-4fab202b84ee.xml.  
38 Gov’t’s Reply at 23 (quoting Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 
1731, 1746 (2020)). 
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that it does not fall under the “general statutory rule” because 
the statute requires it to act with a particular “purpose” that it 
does not have; it does not seek to create an “exception.”  
Although not dispositive, Congress’s appropriation decisions 




 Safehouse’s construction avoids these absurd results.  
Illicit drug activity does not motivate parents to make their 
home available to an adult son who is addicted to heroin.  To 
the contrary, they want their son’s drug use to stop.  Nor does 
illicit drug activity motivate shelter operators to admit 
homeless people; or vacationing homeowners to look the other 
way when their house sitters use drugs; or landlords to continue 
leasing property to HUD recipients.  In each instance, the 
owners act despite their knowledge that drug use will occur, 
not for the purpose that drug use occur.  
 
 By contrast, and contrary to the government’s 
assertions, illicit drug activity does motivate drug dealers to 
operate crack houses.  They may have an overarching motive 
of making money, but they specifically desire to achieve that 
end through drug sales.  They want the drug sales to occur.  
Making the property available to customers to buy and use 
drugs also facilitates the dealer’s unlawful purpose by helping 
to avoid police.  Similarly, drug sales and use are part of rave 
operators’ business models because they drive up attendance.  
Thus, in United States v. Tebeau,39 there was ample 
circumstantial evidence that the campground owner wanted 
 
39 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 
16 
attendees to use drugs.  Drug use and sales at his music 
festivals were so widespread that they presumably influenced 
attendance, for which the owner charged a $50 admission fee.  
Indeed, the owner explicitly instructed security to admit 




 In sum, despite complaining that Safehouse’s 
construction is somehow inconsistent with the statute’s 
ambiguous text, the Majority has not identified a single 
inconsistency.  Instead, the Majority relies on textual gloss 
after textual gloss, read into the statute by other courts of 
appeals over the last thirty years.  The result is like a George 
Orwell novel where identical words have different meanings, 
different words are superfluous, and two plus two equals five.  
Furthermore, the Majority would require a defendant to divine 
whether a third party’s illicit purpose is “primary,” 
“substantial,” “incidental,” or whatever other adjective fits the 
government’s argument at a given moment.  Far from having a 
“well-established limiting principle,”40 the Majority does not 
define these terms, and courts have had substantial difficulty 
pinning them down.   
 
 I would construe section (a)(2)’s purpose element 
consonant with the identical language in section (a)(1) and not 
contrary to virtually every other criminal statute on the books.  
If the government wishes to prosecute Safehouse, it must show 
that Safehouse will act with the requisite purpose.  As 
explained below, the government has not done so. 
 




 I agree with the Majority that a defendant can have 
multiple purposes and still be criminally liable.41  I also agree 
that a defendant’s intentional, unlawful acts usually are not 
excused merely because they are a step to achieving some 
benevolent goal.  Thus, in United States v. Romano,42  we held 
that a lawful motive was not a defense to a crime requiring the 
defendant to act with “an” or “any” “unlawful purpose.”43  
Where, as here, a statute uses the phrase “for the purpose of,”44 
however, our precedents focus on the defendant’s 
motivations.45  Accordingly, I would hold that a defendant, 
who is not motivated at least in part by a desire for unlawful 
drug activity to occur and who in fact wants to reduce drug 
activity, has not acted with the requisite purpose under section 




 The government concedes that Safehouse’s entire 
facility is the relevant “place.”46  There is no evidence 
suggesting that Safehouse will admit anyone to its facility 
hoping that they will use drugs.  To the contrary, it actively 
 
41 See Hayward, 359 F.3d at 638. 
42 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988). 
43 Romano, 849 F.2d at 812, 816 n.7 (emphasis added); accord 18 
U.S.C. § 1382 (making it unlawful to “go[] upon any military . . . 
installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation” 
(emphasis added)). 
44 United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
45 See Hayward, 359 F.3d at 638. 
46 Nov. 16, 2020 Tr. at 7:13–23, 8:12–23. 
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tries to persuade users to stop.  Unlike drug dealers and rave 
operators, Safehouse’s motivating purpose is to put itself out 
of business.   
 
 The Majority puts undue emphasis on Safehouse’s 
belief that the Consumption Room will make participants more 
amenable to drug treatment.  The record does not show that 
that belief is the Consumption Room’s purpose.  To the 
contrary, increased amenability to drug treatment may be just 
an incidental benefit of making Safehouse’s facility “available 
for use” for the purpose of providing medical care to people 
who would otherwise do drugs on the street and risk 
overdose—just as having an indoor place to use drugs is an 
incidental benefit of “maintaining” a house for the purpose of 
living there.  Significantly, Safehouse does not prefer that 
participants choose the Consumption Room over direct entry 
into rehabilitation:  Participants can always enter drug 
treatment at Safehouse,47 and, for decades, defendant Benitez 
has tried (and continues to try) to have drug users enter into 
rehabilitation through PPP.  
 
 
47 I have again “look[ed] at the factual stipulations,” as the 
government requested, but found nothing suggesting that it “is very 
unlikely” that “somebody could come into Safehouse and not be 
there to . . . ingest drugs” or that Safehouse “is not . . . set up [for] 
people to come in to just get treatment.”  Nov. 16, 2020 Tr. at 17:10–
18:21.  To the contrary, “Safehouse intends to encourage every 
participant to enter drug treatment, which will include an offer to 
commence treatment immediately,” Appx. at 684, ¶ 9 (emphasis 
added), and Safehouse explicitly states on its website that 




 Even if just the Consumption Room, not the full 
Safehouse premises, were the relevant “place,” the 
government’s claim still fails.  In effect, the Majority is trying 
to put yet another gloss on the statute:  Section 856(a)(2) 
requires the defendant to make a place “available for use” for 
the purpose of “using a controlled substance,” not, as the 
Majority would have it, “using a controlled substance [in the 
place].”  Because Safehouse requires participants to bring their 
own drugs, Safehouse likely believes that participants would 
use drugs regardless of whether the Consumption Room is 
available.  Safehouse’s desire for participants to use drugs in 
the Consumption Room, as opposed to the street, does not 
imply that Safehouse desires that they use drugs at all.   
 
 Moreover, and significantly, the record does not suggest 
that participants must use drugs to enter to the Consumption 
Room.  For example, they could go to the Consumption Room 
to receive fentanyl testing or safe-injection education for drugs 
they intend to ingest elsewhere, or Naloxone to treat an 
ongoing overdose that began outside the facility.  Nor is there 
any evidence that the Consumption Room will facilitate drug 
use or that Safehouse believes that it will do so.48  Making the 
 
48 Although the government is correct that § 856(a)(2) does not 
include the word “facilitate,” it is hard to imagine how an action can 
be taken “for” a particular “purpose” if it does not facilitate that 
purpose.  Courts routinely use “purpose” and “facilitate” 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 
816, 824 (2009) (“The Government does nothing for its own cause 
by noting that 21 U.S.C. § 856 makes it a felony to facilitate ‘the 
simple possession of drugs by others by making available for use . . 
. a place for  the purpose of unlawfully using a controlled substance” 
even though the crime facilitated may be a mere misdemeanor.”); 
United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1193 (10th Cir. 2018); 
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Consumption Room available may make drug use safer, but the 
record does not show that safer drug use is easier than unsafe 
drug use or causes more drug use to occur. 
 
 In conclusion, the government has not met its burden of 
showing that drug use will be one of Safehouse’s motivating 
purposes.  Rather, Safehouse is trying to save people’s lives.  
  
B 
 Even if “drug use” were Safehouse’s purpose, 
Safehouse still does not violate the statute.  Moreover, to the 
extent that the Majority holds that Safehouse does, the statute 
is unconstitutional.  “Using a controlled substance” is not 
“unlawful” under federal law; possessing it is.  At oral 
argument, it was suggested that using drugs is unlawful under 
state law.  Not so.  Pennsylvania law criminalizes the use of 
drug paraphernalia in certain circumstances,49 but not the use 
of drugs itself.50 
 
United States v. McGauley, 279 F.3d 62, 76 (1st Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. 
Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Cole, 
262 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ellis, 935  F.2d 
385, 390–91 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 
U.S. 808, 811 (1971); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Mich. Mut. Liab. Co., 277 
F.2d 442, 445 (3d Cir. 1960) (“Removing and replacing the rear 
wheels was to facilitate unloading, not for the purpose of preserving 
an existing state or condition . . . .”). 
49 See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-113(a)(32);  
50 Commonwealth v. Rivera, 367 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. 1976) (“The 
m[e]re possession of such drugs, however, is not an offense under 
the law . . . .”).  The government argues that using drugs necessarily 
involves unlawful possession.  Section 856(a) requires, however, 
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 Moreover, because “drug use” is not unlawful in some 
states but is unlawful in others, we are faced with situations 
where property possessors in different states may be treated 
differently by section 856(a)(2).  In situations where the only 
“unlawful” purpose of an establishment is “drug use,” section 
856(a)(2) would allow someone in one state to use his property 
in ways that someone in another state could not.51  The Equal 
Protection Clause has long been applied to the federal 
government52 and prohibits discrimination that is not 
“rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”53  I 
cannot conceive of any rational basis for prosecuting those who 
manage or control property in a state where “drug use” is 
 
that the defendant act for the purpose of “unlawfully . . . using” 
drugs; it is not enough that they act for the purpose of using drugs 
coupled with some different unlawful activity such as possession.  If 
Congress meant “possessing,” it certainly knew how to say so; 
instead, it said “using.”  Although proof of use can serve as proof of 
unlawful possession, “the terms ‘possession’ and ‘use’ are by no 
means synonymous or interchangeable.”  United States v. Blackston, 
940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991).  The same is true of using drug 
paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting drugs:  The operative 
unlawful conduct is the use of drug paraphernalia for the purpose of 
using drugs; § 856(a) requires the drug use itself, however, to be 
unlawful. 
51 See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 595 (1973) (Brennan, 
J. concurring in par) (“My conclusion that the majority has 
misconstrued the statute is fortified by the conviction that the 
statute, as interpreted by the Court, would be invalid under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
52 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
53 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); cf. 
Soto-Lopez v. N.Y. City Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 755 F.2d 266, 275–76 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
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illegal and not doing so in a state where “drug use” has not 
been made illegal.54   
 
IV 
 In sum, I cannot agree with the Majority’s interpretation 
of section 856(a)(2).  Because Safehouse does not have any of 
the purposes prohibited by section 856(a)(2), I would affirm 
the District Court’s holding that Safehouse’s conduct will not 
violate the CSA.  For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
54 That is not to say that Congress can never incorporate state law 
into a federal criminal statute if it does not discriminate based on the 
location of property or has a rational basis for doing so.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357, 1360–62 (10th Cir. 2014). 
